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4. Summary The first section of this treatise explains the fundamental concepts of the subject of Artificial Intelligence before introducing a short account of The Turing Test and The Chinese Room and thereafter discussing a few of the most relevant critiques of Searle’s thesis. Most of these critiques are wholly or partially rejected allowing for the strongest points to play a crucial role later in the investigation. The second section focuses on the most prevalent Chinese Room critique called The Systems Reply, in particular the version of it purported by the most prominent opponents of Searle, Dennett and Hofstadter, and illustrates it with a basis in the two part-fictional and part-factual books: “The Mind's I” and “Gödel, Escher, Bach.” The two opposing theses, that of Searle and that of Dennett/Hofstadter, are then further contrasted by illustrational comparison with ideas encountered in the entirely fictional novels: “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep” and “Heaven.” The third section is a reflection of what I have learned in the process of conducting this investigation, and the independent thoughts I have contemplated as a result. I seek to prove that while both opposing theses have their strong points, there are still a number of inherent inadequacies in need of being addressed in order for them to be truly convincing. And a conclusion might be that we might never know if it is possible until an Artificial Intelligence actually is created and perhaps not even then. As all of the problems posed by the assignment thereby have been answered, I venture to propose a small direction for future research, that of making a cross-breed between two famous experimental projects – between a project of interactive Artificial Life and a project of a teachable linguistic Artificial Intelligence.
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